University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers

Wharton Pension Research Council

9-1-2014

Retirement Plans and Prospects for Retirement Income Adequacy
Jack VanDerhei
Employee Benefit Research Institution, vanderhei@ebri.org

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Economics Commons

VanDerhei, Jack, "Retirement Plans and Prospects for Retirement Income Adequacy" (2014). Wharton
Pension Research Council Working Papers. 89.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/89

The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2016 publication: Reimagining Pensions.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/89
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Retirement Plans and Prospects for Retirement Income Adequacy
Abstract
Will Americans have enough to live on in retirement? This paper attempts to address that question for the
Baby Boomer and Gen Xer generations. While it is widely accepted that employment-based retirement
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would have sufficient retirement resources is eligibility for participation in an employment-based defined
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Chapter 3
Retirement Plans and Prospects for
Retirement Income Adequacy
Jack VanDerhei

Policymakers, regulators, academics, and individual workers alike have long
been focused on quantifying retirement security through the prism of
retirement income adequacy, and for good reason. Beginning in the late
1990s, the Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute (EBRI) launched a major
project to provide this type of measurement on behalf of several states
concerned about the potential cost(s) to social insurance programs should
their residents lack sufﬁcient income when they reached retirement age.
After conducting studies for Oregon, Kansas, and Massachusetts, we developed a national model for this purpose in 2003—the EBRI Retirement
Security Projection Model® (RSPM). It was updated in 2010 to incorporate
several signiﬁcant shifts in plan design and the ﬁnancial markets, notably
the impacts of deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan freezes, automatic enrollment
provisions for 401(k) plans, and the crises in the ﬁnancial and housing
markets.1 Since that time we have continued to update RSPM on an annual
basis to incorporate the impact of changes in ﬁnancial and real estate
market conditions, as well as for underlying demographic trends and modiﬁcations in 401(k) participant behavior (based on a database of the actual
account activity of some 24 million 401(k) participants).
The aggregate federal deﬁcit number, taking into account current social
security retirement beneﬁt levels and the assumption that net housing
equity is utilized ‘as needed,’ is currently estimated to be $4.1 trillion for
all Baby Boomers and Gen Xers.2 Yet while trillion-dollar deﬁcits are useful
in focusing attention on this problem, they do little to help policymakers
understand exactly where these deﬁcits are coming from—an appreciation
that is key to evaluating and implementing effective remedies.
This chapter begins with a brief background on and an overview of the
model. Results are then reviewed for the impact retirement plans have on
prospects for retirement income adequacy. Baseline results for the probability of not running short of money in retirement (measured by the EBRI
Retirement Readiness Ratings® (RRRs)) are presented, in combination with
a sensitivity analysis to illustrate the impact of changing assumptions with
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respect to a series of variables, including rate of return, utilization of
housing for ﬁnancing retirement, and potential modiﬁcations to future
social security retirement beneﬁts. The next section focuses on how RRR
varies with respect to longevity risks and the impact of potential long-term
health care costs in retirement (e.g. nursing home costs). This is followed by
an analysis of the years until households are projected to run short of money
in retirement, and the size of the present value of accumulated deﬁcits in
retirement (measured by the Retirement Savings Shortfalls (RSS)). A ﬁnal
section offers a brief summary and conclusions.

Quantifying Retirement Income Adequacy
There are several ways to quantify retirement income adequacy. Most models
either (1) account only for the accumulation side of the equation and then
rely on some type of replacement rate measure as a threshold for success, or
(2) make use of a life cycle model that attempts to smooth/spread some type
of consumption-based utility over the decision-maker’s lifetime.
The EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model® takes a different perspective. Our goal was to determine what percentage of future retirement
cohorts would run short of money in retirement and when. Accordingly, the
RSPM did not rely on a replacement rate target as a measure of success,
because very few households annuitize all (or even most) of their individual
accounts in retirement. In other words, a replacement rate focus would
overlook the potential longevity risk. Moreover, while an annuity purchase
price used in a replacement rate target does rely on an implicit assumption
with respect to (at least some) future market returns, it does not typically
account for the potential investment risk associated with ‘risky’ asset allocations. And ﬁnally, an obstacle in terms of maintaining retirement income
adequacy for households who might otherwise have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
resources at retirement age is the risk of long-term care costs for a prolonged period. Few retirees have long-term care insurance policies that
would cover the potentially catastrophic ﬁnancial impact of this exposure.
Consequently, any attempt to incorporate this into a simple replacement
rate threshold needs to be carefully assessed against actual implications.
A life cycle smoothing model was also rejected for the development of RSPM
given the extraordinary low levels of ‘optimal’ savings for low-income individuals at retirement. While there is little doubt that some households may beneﬁt
from means-tested programs in retirement (including early eligibility for
Medicaid), from a policy perspective, we were interested in setting a threshold
that would allow households to afford average expenditures throughout their
retirement, while at the same time accounting for uninsured medical costs in
retirement (including long-term care costs).
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The EBRI Retirement Security
Projection Model®
One objective of RSPM is to simulate the percentage of the population at
risk of not having income adequate to cover average expenses and uninsured health care costs (including long-term care costs) throughout retirement, by income and age groups. RSPM also provides information on the
distribution of the likely number of years before those at risk run short of
money, as well as the percentage of preretirement compensation they would
need as additional savings in order to have a 50, 75, or 90 percent probability
of attaining retirement income adequacy.
VanDerhei and Copeland (2010) describe how households are tracked
through retirement age and how their retirement income/wealth is simulated for the following components: social security, deﬁned contribution
(DC) balances, individual retirement account (IRA) balances, DB annuities
and/or lump-sum distributions, and net housing equity.
A household is considered to run short of money in this model if
aggregate resources in retirement are insufﬁcient to meet average retirement expenditures. The latter are deﬁned as a combination of deterministic expenses from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (as a function
of age and income) and some health insurance and out-of-pocket,
health-related expenses, plus stochastic expenses from nursing home
and home health care (at least until the point such expenses are covered
by Medicaid).3
The baseline version of our model assumes all workers retire at age
65,4 that they immediately begin drawing beneﬁts from social security
and DB plans (if any), and, to the extent that the sum of their expenses
and uninsured medical expenses exceed the projected, after-tax annual
income from those sources, immediately begin to withdraw money
from their individual accounts (DC and cash balance plans, as well as
IRAs). If there is sufﬁcient money to pay expenses without tapping into
the tax-qualiﬁed individual accounts, those balances are assumed to be
invested in a non-tax-advantaged account where the investment income
is taxed as ordinary income. Individual accounts are tracked until they
are depleted. At that point, any net housing equity is assumed to be
added to retirement savings in the form of a lump-sum distribution
(rather than a reverse annuity mortgage, or RAM). When all retirement
savings are exhausted and if the social security and DB payments are
insufﬁcient to pay expenses, the individual is designated as having run
short of money.
One of the model’s primary outputs is the production of RRRs for various
subgroups of the population. The RRR is deﬁned as the percentage of
simulated life-paths that do not run short of money in retirement.
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Results
Our model focuses on four output metrics for retirement income
adequacy:5 Retirement Readiness Ratings; years until the household runs
short of money in retirement; Retirement Savings Shortfalls; and the percentage of additional compensation that must be saved annually until
retirement for a 50, 75, or 90 percent chance of covering simulated
expenses. These metrics have been used to analyze the impact of retirement
plans on prospects for retirement income adequacy under several scenarios,
including those that follow.

Annuitizing DC and IRA balances at retirement age
VanDerhei and Copeland (2004) analyzed the impact of annuitizing DC
and IRA balances at retirement age and therefore needed to simulate a
signiﬁcant number of future life-paths to capture the longevity risk experienced by retirees. The output metric used was the median percentage of
additional compensation that must be saved annually until retirement for a
75 percent chance of covering simulated expenses. Assuming that all DB
participants took lump-sum distributions at retirement, the average annual
increase in additional savings needed was 14.9 percent, whereas assuming
that all individual accounts were annuitized at retirement had an impact
twice as large—but in the opposite direction (a 30.0 percent decrease in
additional annual savings needed).

Impact of deferring retirement age
VanDerhei and Copeland (2011) added a new feature that allowed households to defer retirement age past age 65, to determine whether retirement
age deferral is indeed sufﬁciently valuable to mitigate retirement income
adequacy problems for most households.6 The answer, unfortunately, is not
always ‘yes,’ even if retirement age were deferred into the 80s. RSPM
baseline results indicate that the lowest pre-retirement income quartile
would need to defer retirement age to 84, before 90 percent of the households would have a 50 percent probability of success. Although a signiﬁcant
portion of the improvement takes place in the ﬁrst four years after age 65, it
tends to level off in the early 70s before picking up in the late 70s and early
80s. Households in higher pre-retirement income quartiles start at a much
higher level, and therefore gain less from deferring retirement. If the
success rate is moved to a threshold of 70 percent, only two out of ﬁve
households in the lowest-income quartile would attain retirement income
adequacy even if they deferred retirement age to 84. Increasing the threshold to 80 percent reduces the number of lowest pre-retirement income
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quartile households satisfying this standard at a retirement age of 84 to
approximately one out of seven. A factor that makes a major difference in
the percentage of households satisfying the retirement income adequacy
thresholds at any retirement age is whether the worker is still participating in
a DC plan after age 65. Doing so results in at least a 10 percentage point
difference in the majority of the retirement age/income combinations
investigated.7

Impact of the low interest rate environment
VanDerhei (2013b) also used RSPM to show that 25–7 percent of Baby
Boomers and Gen Xers who would have had adequate retirement income
(under historical average return assumptions) were simulated to end up
running short of money in retirement, if the historically low interest rates at
the time were assumed to be permanent.

Retirement Readiness Ratings
A notable ﬁnding of our modelling was the signiﬁcant importance of stochastic health care costs on overall retirement income adequacy
(VanDerhei 2012a). This term is meant to include health care costs in
retirement that are not likely to occur every year (in fact they may never
occur for many households), but when they do, they may have a catastrophic
ﬁnancial impact due to their daily cost and/or duration. Unlike many other
retirement projection models,8 RSPM has explicitly included the costs of
nursing home and home health care costs in its decumulation model to
account for these contingencies. We show the potential impact of ignoring
these costs on measurements of retirement income adequacy.

Baseline results
Our baseline scenario labels households with sufﬁcient resources to cover
100 percent of simulated retirement expenses as those who do not run short
of money in retirement. Yet some retirement planners suggest that many
households can successfully cut expenditures when ﬁnancially constrained.
Therefore, we also recompute results for thresholds of two other simulated
expense levels.
Panel A of Table 3.1 provides the ratings by age cohort computed at three
different income adequacy thresholds: 100, 90, and 80 percent of simulated
retirement expenses. It also provides RRR values for two different scenarios:
one where stochastic health care costs (i.e. long-term care and home health
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table 3.1 2014 Retirement Readiness Ratings™ with and without long-term care
(LTC) and home health costs (HHC)
% of simulated
retirement expenses
100

90

80

Early Boomers
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

56.7
71.94

67.4
79.43

82
88.27

Late Boomers
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

57.7
75.61

67.4
81.42

81
88.94

Gen Xers
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

58.5
79.03

69.8
87.17

83.7
95.87

Lowest income quartile
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

16.8
29.97

30
44.25

54.6
69.66

Second
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

52.6
79.93

65.7
90.54

0.827
0.9663

Third
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

71.7
93.64

81.9
97.52

92.7
99.23

Highest income quartile
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

86.4
98.73

92.9
99.58

97.9
99.87

None
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

39.67
62.16

50.58
70.84

69.09
84.31

1–9
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

60.63
86.33

70.93
91.64

83.96
96.78

10–19
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

73.15
92.04

81.74
95.58

91.32
98.4

20+
With LTC and HHC
Without LTC and HHC

85.48
97.91

91.56
98.94

96.83
99.64

Panel A: by age cohort

Panel B: by pre-retirement income quartile

Panel C: by future years of eligibility
for a deﬁned contribution plan

Notes : Percentage of simulated life paths that will not run short of money in retirement at
various thresholds. Early Boomers refer to those born 1948–54. Late Boomers refer to those
born 1955–64. Gen Xers refer to those born 1965–74.
Source : Author’s computations.
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costs) are included, and those in which they are excluded. More than half of
the Early Boomers (56.7 percent) are projected to have sufﬁcient retirement resources to cover 100 percent of their simulated expenses in retirement (including long-term care and home health costs). This value
increases to more than two-thirds (67.4 percent) if only 90 percent of the
simulated expenses need to be covered, and to 82.0 percent if the threshold
is decreased to 80 percent of simulated expenses. By contrast, when the
Early Boomers’ life-paths are simulated assuming no long-term care and
home health costs, the RRRs increase substantially (this is the implicit
assumption of models that do not take these expenses into account). Now
71.9 percent will not run short of money at a threshold of 100 percent of
simulated expenses, rising to 79.4 percent at a 90 percent of simulated
expense threshold, and 88.3 percent at an 80 percent expense threshold.
Looking across cohorts, readiness rates for Late Boomer and Gen Xers
are very similar to those for Early Boomers when long-term care and home
health costs are included.9 For the younger cohorts, when these costs are
omitted, the RRR values show a deﬁnite upward trend in the fraction
projected to have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources.
Panel B in Table 3.1 provides readiness rates by pre-retirement wage
quartiles at the three different thresholds, for both health care cost scenarios.10 Unlike Panel A, Panel B indicates large disparities between the
various categories analyzed. At a 100-percent simulated expense threshold
for the scenario that includes long-term care and home health costs, only
16.8 percent of the simulated life-paths for those in the lowest-income
quartile have retirement resources sufﬁcient to prevent them from running
short of money in retirement. More than three times as many (52.6 percent)
of those in the second-income quartile are projected to have sufﬁcient
resources, compared to 71.7 percent for those in the third-income quartile.
The maximum value is of 86.4 percent for the highest-income quartile.
Some of this disparity declines if the thresholds are relaxed. At an 80 percent
of simulated expense threshold, more than half (54.6 percent) of the lowest
income quartile are now projected to not run short of money in retirement.
This value increases to 82.7 percent for the second quartile, 92.7 percent for
the third quartile, and 97.9 percent for the highest income quartile.
Panel C of Table 3.1 shows the positive impact of future years of eligibility
for a DC plan (regardless of whether the employee chooses to participate)
for Gen Xers by pre-retirement wage quartile.11 Again, all three thresholds
are shown for both scenarios with respect to long-term care and home
health costs. For Gen Xers with no future eligibility for a DC plan, the
RRR value is only 39.7 percent, suggesting that more than 60 percent
would run short of resources in retirement. This value increases more
than 20 percentage points to 60.6 percent projected to not run short for
those with 1–9 future years of eligibility in a DC plan, and to 73.2 percent of
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those in this category with 10–19 future years of eligibility in a DC plan. For
those with 20 or more future years of eligibility in a DC plan, 85.5 percent
are projected to not run short.
Similar results are found for Gen Xers at the other expense thresholds.
For example, at an 80 percent of simulated expense threshold, the RRR
values range from 69.1 percent for those with no future years of eligibility to
96.8 percent for those with 20 or more years.

Sensitivity analysis
A model as complex as RSPM relies on a large number of assumptions to
simulate the ﬁnancial circumstances of households over their life cycles, to
determine if and when they will ultimately run short in retirement. Some of
the most important include rates of return in the ﬁnancial market; how net
housing equity is used to ﬁnance retirement; and future beneﬁt streams
from social security. This section summarizes the impacts of these three
assumptions (VanDerhei 2014). In each case, the sensitivity analysis assumes
a threshold of 100 percent of simulated expenses, and long-term care and
home health costs are included.

Rate of return assumptions
The baseline rate of return used in the 2014 RSPM was generated from
stochastic annual returns with a log-normal distribution and an arithmetic
mean of 8.6 percent real return for stocks and 2.6 percent real return for
bonds (Finke et al. 2013). Net returns were computed by subtracting 78 basis
points from gross returns.12 Although these parameters were based on
historical evidence from 1926–2011 (the most recent results available the
last time the baseline return assumptions were reset), some may question
whether they are too optimistic for today’s Baby Boomers and Gen Xers.
Therefore, various ad-hoc reductions (10, 25, and 50 percent) in real
returns for both stocks and bonds are also applied, to measure their impact
on RRR outcomes.
The RRR for the baseline return assumptions for Early Boomers is 56.7
percent, indicating that just over half of the cohort is projected to have
sufﬁcient funds in retirement to cover the expenses outlined. If real returns
are decreased by 10 percent (0.86 percent for stocks and 0.26 percent for
bonds), the RRR value falls by 1.5 percentage points to 55.2 percent.
Decreasing projected real returns by 25 percent results in a reduction to
53.3 percent, while decreasing real returns by 50 percent results in a 6.6
percentage point reduction from the baseline assumptions to 50.1 percent.
Similar results obtain for the Late Boomers and Gen Xers, though given
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their somewhat longer average investment horizons, one would expect
somewhat larger impacts on their RRRs. Indeed, the difference between
the baseline RRR results and those with the 50 percent lower returns
increases from 6.6 percentage points for the Early Boomers to 6.8 percentage points for the Late Boomers and 7.8 percentage points for the Gen Xers.
When we explore the impact of return assumptions on the lowest preretirement wage quartile, we ﬁnd a minimal impact, which is to be expected
given their relatively low DC and IRA balances. The difference between the
baseline RRR results and those with the 50 percent real return reduction for
this group is only 0.2 percentage points. This range increases to 5.0 percentage points for the second-income quartile and 6.5 percentage points for the
third-income quartile before falling to 4.6 percentage points for the highestincome quartile.13

Housing utilization assumptions
In our baseline model, net housing equity is assumed to be accessible as a
lump sum when needed. This produces an RRR value of 56.7 percent for
Early Boomers. If net housing equity is instead assumed to be annuitized at
retirement, the percent of individuals projected to have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
resources in retirement decreases to 52.6 percent. If net housing equity is
not used at all for retirement, the RRR drops to 50.4 percent. Similar results
obtain for Late Boomers and Gen Xers.

Modiﬁcations in social security retirement beneﬁts
Our baseline RSPM runs assume that future social security retirement
beneﬁts under current law will not be modiﬁed. Nevertheless, the current
Social Security Trustee’s Report projects that the funds for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) will be exhausted by 2033 (US SSA
2013). This may require beneﬁt reductions for at least some cohorts of
retirees. To assess the potential impact of such a change, pro-rata reductions
are applied to social security retirement beneﬁts for the sensitivity analysis,
and aggregate shortfalls are converted into a pro-rata reduction for all
retirees on an annual basis. This would result in a reduction in social security
retirement beneﬁts of 21.9 percent in 2033 and would eventually reach a
level of 27.0 percent in 2090.14
Our simulations show this would have only a minimal impact on the Early
Boomers, decreasing RRR from 56.7 percent to 56.0 percent. But those
in the Late Boomer cohort would be more affected, reducing the RRR by
2.2 percentage points (from 58.5 to 56.3 percent). The reductions would
affect the Gen Xers for a larger portion of their retirement years, and
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consequently their RRR would decrease by 6.8 percentage points (from 57.5
to 50.9 percent).
Given the progressive nature of the social security beneﬁt formula, the
lowest-income quartile would experience the largest impact, with an RRR
reduction of 10.6 percentage points; the value drops by more than half,
from 20.9 to 10.3 percent. The impact is smaller for their higher-paid
counterparts, for whom social security beneﬁts generally comprise a smaller
proportion of post-retirement income. The second-income quartile experiences an RRR reduction of 8.0 percentage points, compared with 5.8 percentage points for the third-income quartile and only 3.5 percentage points
for the highest-income quartile.

What drives Retirement Readiness Ratings?
We have also analyzed the replacement-rate levels required to provide
retirees with a 50, 75, and 90 percent probability of having ‘sufﬁcient’
retirement income (VanDerhei 2006, 2014). A ‘building block’ approach
was adopted where the risks of investment, longevity, and stochastic longterm health care costs were added in incremental layers.15 In each case, the
analysis was conducted assuming a threshold of 100 percent of simulated
expenses and that long-term care and home health costs were included.

Longevity
To assess the impact of longevity on retirement income adequacy, we compute longevity quartiles by family status, gender, and age cohort. We ﬁnd that
the RRR (75.8 percent) for the Early Boomers simulated to die in the earliest
relative quartile is 19.1 percentage points above the overall average for this
age cohort, suggesting that those who die earliest have a better likelihood of
not running short. The RRR decreases to 63.1 percent in the second-longevity
quartile and 44.9 percent in the third-longevity quartile. For the Early Boomer
cohort with the longest relative longevity, the RRR falls all the way to 37.9
percent. Similar patterns are found for younger age cohorts, but there is a
noticeable increase in the RRR range between the earliest and latest longevity
quartile: 37.9 percentage points for Early Boomers, 41.3 percentage points for
Late Boomers, and 49.2 percentage points for Gen Xers.

Stochastic long-term health care costs
To analyze healthcare costs, we arrange our simulated paths into four
groups from lowest to highest (based on the present value at age 65 per
capita stochastic health care costs in 2014 dollars). Early Boomers in the
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bottom quartile of the health care cost distribution have a RRR of 73.4
percent (meaning that nearly three-quarters of this group will have sufﬁcient funds), while the RRR for those in the top cost quartile—those with
highest projected health care costs—drops to 22.9 percent (for a difference
of 50.5 percentage points). The younger age cohorts experience similar
results, with a somewhat larger range (52.4 percentage points for the Late
Boomers and 58.7 percentage points for the Gen Xers).
The probability of not running short of money in retirement is virtually zero
for the lowest-income quartile with the highest health care costs.16 Those in the
lowest-income quartile with the lowest health care costs have a much higher
probability of having enough money, with an RRR value of 30.0 percent. The
second-income quartile has the largest range in RRR values between the lowest
and highest quartile of stochastic health care costs (77.1 percentage points),
followed by the third-income quartile (66.9 percentage points). The range for
the highest-income quartile (40 percentage points) is somewhat larger than
the lowest-income quartile (29.9 percentage points); however, the range for
both is truncated by the deﬁnitional limits of the RRR calculation.

Regression results for retirement readiness ratings
The previous sections analyzed one by one the important ways that Boomer
and Gen Xer households are projected to run short of money in retirement.
Next we analyze these factors as a group using multivariate regression.
Table 3.2 provides six different sets of probit estimates of the probability of
running short of money in retirement: using three thresholds each for
single and married households. In each case, the scenario includes the
costs of long-term care and home health costs.
The top panel in Table 3.2 uses a dependent variable equal to zero if the
household does not run short of money in retirement at a 100 percent of
simulated expense threshold, or equal to one if it does. The second panel
uses a similar deﬁnition at a 90 percent threshold, while the third panel uses
an 80 percent threshold.
The variables used in this analysis are deﬁned as follows:

• The INCOME variables are dummy variables placing each household
into age-speciﬁc income quartiles based on indexed career earnings
similar to those used in the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)
calculations (without truncation at the upper end). INCOME2 designates the second income quartile, INCOME3 the third income quartile
and INCOME4 the highest income quartile (INCOME1 designating
the lowest income quartile is the omitted reference category).
• SINGLEMALE = 1 for males and 0 for females.
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table 3.2 Probit estimates of the probability of running short of money in retirement
Single males and single females

Married households

Parameter
Intercept
AGE
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
SINGLEMALE
ELIGIBLE
DEATHAGE
LTC

Estimate
2.251
18.201
1.248
1.989
2.663
0.408
0.348
26.354
3.440

St. Error
0.002
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.024
0.001

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Parameter
Intercept
AGE
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
SINGLEMALE
ELIGIBLE
DEATHAGE
LTC

Estimate
1.503
16.310
1.115
1.840
2.513
0.460
0.362
11.111
3.604

St. Error
0.002
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.024
0.001

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Parameter
Intercept
AGE
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
SINGLEMALE
ELIGIBLE
DEATHAGE
LTC

Estimate
0.054
14.055
0.912
1.566
2.237
0.431
0.357
17.087
3.513

St. Error
0.002
0.022
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.027
0.001

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Parameter
Intercept
AGE
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
ELIGIBLE
DEATHAGE
LTC

Estimate
1.062
11.429
1.050
1.849
2.821
0.017
12.857
3.959

St. Error
0.006
0.055
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.000
0.067
0.003

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Parameter
Intercept
AGE
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
ELIGIBLE
DEATHAGE
LTC

Estimate
0.649
8.369
0.941
1.644
2.592
0.028
2.020
3.751

St. Error
0.007
0.063
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.078
0.003

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Parameter
Intercept
AGE
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
ELIGIBLE
DEATHAGE
LTC

Estimate
0.605
9.826
0.997
1.527
2.371
0.012
24.771
3.656

St. Error
0.010
0.091
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.116
0.004

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. See text for variable
deﬁnitions.
Sources : Author’s computations.

• The ELIGIBLE variable denotes the percentage of future years of work
with an employer offering a DC plan.

• DEATHAGE = the age of death (second death in the case of families).
• LTC = the present value of long-term care and home health care costs
(in thousands of 2014 dollars).

• The AGE variable is the current age of the individual (older of the two
individuals for married).
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In each of the six regressions, the AGE variable has a positive effect,
suggesting that older cohorts will actually have a higher probability of
running short of money in retirement. The INCOME variables designate
the probability of running short of money in retirement relative to the
lowest income quartile. In each of the six regressions, the coefﬁcients
are monotonically decreasing, which indicates that the higher the relative
income level, the lower the probability of running short of money in
retirement.
The ELIGIBLE variable is negative in each of the six regressions, suggesting that, all else equal, the more future years a household is eligible for
participation in a DC plan (relative to the number of future years they work
prior to retirement), the smaller their probability of running short. The
LTC variable is positive in all six regressions, which suggests that the larger
the present value of long-term care and home health costs (in constant
dollars), the higher the probability of running short.
The SINGLEMALE variable is negative in each of the three regressions it
was used. This suggests that, compared to single females, men have a smaller
probability of running short of money in retirement after controlling for the
other factors.
The DEATHAGE variable (designating the age of simulated death) is the
only variable whose sign changes as the thresholds vary. For the 100 and 90
percent thresholds, the coefﬁcient is always positive, suggesting that the
longer a household lives, the larger the probability that it will run short of
money in retirement. By contrast, when the threshold of simulated expenses
is lowered to the 80 percent level, the sign changes, indicating an opposite
result.17

Years Until the Households Run Short of
Money in Retirement
We are also interested in when shortfalls might occur, if they do. Figures 3.1
through 3.3 provide this type of information for the Boomer and Gen Xer
demographics. The analysis is more complicated than a simple computation
of when individuals or families run short of retirement income (which in most
cases will be never, due to lifetime social security beneﬁts). As noted above,
an individual or family is considered to ‘run short of money’ here if the
household’s aggregate retirement resources are insufﬁcient to meet its
aggregate average retirement expenditures goal. This is deﬁned as a combination of deterministic expenses from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(as a function of income) and some health insurance and out-of-pocket
health-related expenses, plus stochastic expenses from nursing home and
home health care expenses (at least until the point they are picked up by
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Figure 3.1 Years in retirement before Boomers and Gen Xers run short of money, by
pre-retirement income quartile: simulations with the 2014 version of the EBRI
Retirement Security Projection Model®
Note : An individual or family is considered to run short of money in this version of the model if
their aggregate resources in retirement are not sufﬁcient to meet aggregate minimum retirement expenditures deﬁned as a combination of deterministic expenses from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (as a function of income) and some health insurance and out-of-pocket
health-related expenses, plus stochastic expenses from nursing home and home health care
expenses (at least until the point they are picked up by Medicaid). The resources in retirement
will consist of Social Security, account balances from deﬁned contribution plans, IRAs and/or
cash balance plans, annuities from deﬁned beneﬁt plans (unless the lump-sum distribution
scenario is chosen), and (in some cases) net housing equity (in the form of a lump-sum
distribution).
Source : Author’s computations.

Medicaid). In each case, the analysis is conducted assuming a threshold of
100 percent of simulated expenses, and long-term care and home health
costs are included.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of how long retirement money will last
for Baby Boomers and Gen Xers (assuming retirement at age 65), by preretirement income quartile. For example, after 10 years of retirement,
three-quarters of those in the lowest income quartile are projected to have
run short of money, 19 percent in the second income quartile, 8 percent in
the third income quartile, and 2 percent in the highest income quartile.
After 20 years of retirement, 84 percent of those in the lowest income
quartile are projected to have run short of money, 39 percent in the second
income quartile, 20 percent in the third income quartile, and 8 percent in
the highest income quartile. A total of 87 percent of those in the lowest
income quartile who retire at age 65 are projected to eventually run short of
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Figure 3.2 Years in retirement before Boomers and Gen Xers run short of money, by
relative longevity quartile: simulations with the 2014 version of the EBRI Retirement
Security Projection Model®
Note : An individual or family is considered to run short of money in this version of the model if
their aggregate resources in retirement are not sufﬁcient to meet aggregate minimum retirement
expenditures deﬁned as a combination of deterministic expenses from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (as a function of income) and some health insurance and out-of-pocket health-related
expenses, plus stochastic expenses from nursing home and home health care expenses (at least
until the point they are picked up by Medicaid). The resources in retirement will consist of Social
Security, account balances from deﬁned contribution plans, IRAs and/or cash balance plans,
annuities from deﬁned beneﬁt plans (unless the lump-sum distribution scenario is chosen), and
(in some cases) net housing equity (in the form of a lump-sum distribution).
Source : Author’s computations.

money while they are still alive. This value decreases to 48 percent for those
in the second income quartile, 29 percent for those in the third income
quartile, and 14 percent for those in the highest income quartile.
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of how long retirement money will last
for Baby Boomers and Gen Xers (assuming retirement at age 65) by relative
longevity quartile. For example, after 10 years of retirement, 22 percent of
those in the earliest longevity quartile class are projected to run short of
money compared to 28 percent of those in the latest longevity quartile. After
20 years of retirement, 23 percent of those in the earliest longevity quartile
class are projected to have run short of money compared to 46 percent of
those in the latest longevity quartile. A total of 23 percent of those in the
earliest longevity quartile class who retire at age 65 are projected to eventually run short of money while they are still alive. This value increases to 63
percent for those in the oldest longevity quartile.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of how long retirement money is projected to last for Baby Boomers and Gen Xers (assuming retirement at age
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Figure 3.3 Years in retirement before Boomers and Gen Xers run short of money, by
quartile of stochastic health care cost: simulations with the 2014 version of the EBRI
Retirement Security Projection Model®
Note : An individual or family is considered to run short of money in this version of the model if
their aggregate resources in retirement are not sufﬁcient to meet aggregate minimum retirement expenditures deﬁned as a combination of deterministic expenses from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (as a function of income) and some health insurance and out-of-pocket
health-related expenses, plus stochastic expenses from nursing home and home health care
expenses (at least until the point they are picked up by Medicaid). The resources in retirement
will consist of Social Security, account balances from deﬁned contribution plans, IRAs and/or
cash balance plans, annuities from deﬁned beneﬁt plans (unless the lump-sum distribution
scenario is chosen), and (in some cases) net housing equity (in the form of a lump-sum
distribution).
Source : Author’s computations.

65) by quartile of health care cost. For example: after 10 years of retirement,
22 percent of those in the lowest health care cost quartile are projected to
run short of money compared to 33 percent of those in the highest health
care cost quartile. After 20 years of retirement, 25 percent of those in the
lowest health care cost quartile are projected to have run short of money
compared to 59 percent of those in the highest health care cost quartile.
A total of 25 percent of those in the lowest health care cost quartile who
retire at age 65 are projected to eventually run short of money while they are
still alive. This value increases to 76 percent for those in the highest health
care cost quartile.

Retirement Savings Shortfalls
It is also useful to model just how large the accumulated deﬁcits are likely
to be, conditional on a shortfall. We analyze this assuming a threshold of
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table 3.3 2014 retirement savings shortfalls (US$) by age cohort, marital status, and
gender
Single Male
Panel A: includes those with no shortfall
Early Boomers
33,778
Late Boomers
31,342
Gen Xers
38,065
Panel B:conditional upon having a positive shortfall
Early Boomers
93,576
Late Boomers
102,287
Gen Xers
129,861

Single Female

Married

62,734
65,277
74,256

19,304
19,566
21,379

104,821
112,651
133,790

71,299
76,222
82,083

Note : The Retirement Savings Shortfalls (RSS) are determined as a present value of retirement
deﬁcits at age 65.
Source : Author’s computations.

100 percent of simulated expenses, and including long-term care and home
health costs.
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the shortfalls by cohort, marital status, and sex,
for both Baby Boomers and Gen Xers. We provide information on average
individual retirement income deﬁcits as present values at age 65, and we
represent how much extra would have to be saved by age 65, to eliminate
expected retirement deﬁcits (which, depending on the simulated life-path,
could be a relatively short period or could last decades). The additional
savings required for those on the verge of retirement (Early Boomers) vary
from $19,304 (per individual) for married households, increasing to $33,778
for single males and $62,733 for single females. Even though the present
values are deﬁned in constant dollars, the RSS for both genders increase for
younger cohorts, mainly due to the assumption that health care-related costs
will increase faster than the general inﬂation rate.
While the RSS values in Panel A of Table 3.3 may appear to be relatively
small, considering they represent the sum of present values that may include
decades of deﬁcits, it is important to remember that less than half of the
simulated life-paths modeled were considered to be ‘at risk.’ In other words,
the average RSS values represented in Panel A of Table 3.3 are reduced by
the inclusion of simulated retirement life-paths that will not run short of
money. Looking only at those situations where shortfalls are projected,
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows that the values for Early Boomers vary from
$71,299 (per individual) for married households, $93,576 for single males,
and $104,821 for single females. In sum, the average shortfall is large if we
focus only on households with a projected shortfall.
As noted above, eligibility for participation in a DC plan can have a
signiﬁcantly positive impact on reducing projected savings shortfalls.
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table 3.4 2014 unconditional retirement savings shortfalls (US$), by years of future
eligibility for participation in a deﬁned contribution plan
Income Quartiles
Years of Future Eligibility

Lowest

Second

Third

Highest

Total

0
1–9
10–19
20+

107,519
100,326
85,647
88,857

74,901
73,550
49,132
34,539

57,179
44,821
22,201
13,310

32,466
24,058
8,380
4,751

78,297
52,113
32,937
16,782

Note : The Retirement Savings Shortfalls (RSS) are determined as a present value of retirement
deﬁcits at age 65.
Source : Author’s computations.

Table 3.4 provides information on the average individual retirement
income deﬁcits by the number of future years eligible for coverage in a
DC retirement plan for Gen Xers. The deﬁcit values for those assumed to
have no future years of eligibility (simulated to never be employed in the
future by an organization that provides access to those plans) is $78,297 per
individual. That shortfall decreases substantially for those with 1–9 years of
future eligibility, to $52,113, and even further to $32,937 for those with
10–19 years of future eligibility. Gen Xers fortunate enough to have at
least 20 years of future eligibility in those programs could ﬁnd their average
shortfall at retirement reduced to only $16,782.
Table 3.4 also provides similar information about the impact of future
eligibility for DC plans for Gen Xers, although this time the analysis also
controls for relative levels of pre-retirement income. For those in the lowestincome quartile, the average deﬁcit declines from $107,519 for those with
no years of future eligibility to $88,857 for those with 20 or more years.
A similar reduction is found for the higher-income quartiles.

Conclusion
Will Americans have enough to live on in retirement? We address this
question using a variety of ‘success’ thresholds and circumstances for the
Baby Boomer and Gen Xer generations, most of whom have not yet retired,
and for whom changes in behavior and/or policy might still positively
inﬂuence outcomes.
As outlined, the results are sensitive to assumptions, thresholds, and
deﬁnitions. If one assumes that 100 percent of simulated expenses in retirement is an adequate income goal, then in aggregate, between 57 and 59
percent of the simulated retirement paths for households in those age
cohorts will not run short of money in retirement. Choosing a less restrictive
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threshold increases the percentage of households found to have adequate
retirement income: at 90 percent of simulated retirement expenses,
between 67 and 70 percent of the households will not run short of money
in retirement, and at 80 percent of simulated expenses level, the values
increase to 81–84 percent. If one chooses (explicitly, or as many models do
today, implicitly) to ignore nursing home and home health costs in retirement, the percentages of households deemed to have adequate retirement
income increases even further.
Sensitivity analysis shows that the RRR values are relatively robust with
respect to return assumptions. Even with a 50 percent reduction in historical
real returns, RRR values only decrease 6.6–7.8 percentage points on average, depending on the age cohort, suggesting a relatively modest impact on
retirement readiness by market returns. Assumptions on how housing values
are used to ﬁnance retirement are more important; yet, on average, the
difference between utilizing the net housing equity as a lump sum once
other retirement resources are depleted versus not utilizing it at all changes
the RRR values by only 4.4–6.3 percentage points, depending on the age
cohort.
While it is widely accepted that employment-based retirement plans have
played a signiﬁcant role in providing retirement income to American workers, this chapter also quantiﬁes the impact these programs have in the
determination of retirement income adequacy.18 Analyzing the importance
of eligibility for and participation in DC plans is difﬁcult, in view of the
various employee behaviors that must be modeled to account for participation, contribution, and asset allocation choices, as well as cash-out versus
rollover activity at job change. It is also critically important to accurately
portray the variation in plan design among DC plans. This chapter shows
that one of the most important factors in determining whether Gen Xers
(those with the longest remaining time in the workforce) will have sufﬁcient
retirement income is eligibility for participation in an employment-based
DC plan. RRR values double for Gen Xers in the lowest-income quartile,
when comparing those with 20 or more years of future eligibility to those
with no years of future eligibility, while those in the second- and thirdincome quartiles experience increases in RRR values by 27–30.3 percentage
points. Unfortunately not all households are covered by retirement plans for
a substantial portion of their working careers.19 As a result, many households, especially those in the lower income quartiles, appear to be in danger
of running short of money in retirement.
For those projected to run short of money in retirement, how rapidly will
the shortfall occur? We show that 26 percent of Boomer and Gen Xer
households are simulated to run short of money within 10 years of retirement under our baseline assumptions (and at a 100 percent of simulated
expense threshold). This increases to 37 percent after 20 years. The timing
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also depends on income; for the lowest income quartile, 75 percent are
found to run short of money within 10 years of retirement, and 84 percent
within 20 years.
Another way to quantify the shortfalls for those simulated to run short of
money in retirement is to compute the present value of all future deﬁcits as
of retirement age. In essence, this is the additional amount of money each
household would need to have (on an after-tax basis) to avoid running short
of money in retirement. Looking only at cases where shortfalls are projected, the values for Early Boomers vary from $71,299 (per individual) for
married households, increasing to $93,576 for single males and $104,821 for
single females. These values are larger for younger cohorts. For Gen Xers,
the values vary from $82,083 (per individual) for married households,
increasing to $129,861 for single males, and $133,790 for single females.20
Finally, we have shown that a great deal of the readiness variability can
be reduced by risk-management techniques at or near retirement. For
example, annuitizing a portion of DC and IRA balances could increase the
probability of not running short of money in retirement (VanDerhei 2006;
Park 2011). Moreover, affordable long-term care insurance would appear to
provide an extremely useful technique to help control the threat of health
care cost risk, especially for those in the second- and third-income quartiles.

End notes
1. A brief chronology of RSPM is provided in Appendix A of VanDerhei (2014).
2. This is a decrease from the 2012 number of $4.3 trillion (VanDerhei 2012b). The
2012 number is somewhat smaller than the $4.6 trillion reported in VanDerhei
(2010); however, the baseline assumptions used in the 2010 analysis did not
provide for the utilization of net housing equity to ensure retirement income
adequacy. When the 2012 analysis is repeated with the same assumptions as used
in 2010, the aggregate deﬁcit actually increased to $4.8 trillion.
3. The stochastic component of health expenditures is the result of simulated health
events that would require long-term care in a nursing home or home-based
setting for the elderly. Neither of these simulated types of care would be reimbursed by Medicare, because they would be for custodial (rather than rehabilitative) care. To determine whether an individual has these expenses, the following
process is undertaken. Each individual reaching the social security normal retirement age has a probability of being in one of four possible assumed ‘health’
statuses: (1) not receiving either home health or nursing home care; (2) home
health care patient; (3) nursing home care patient; (4) dead. The individual is
randomly assigned to one of these four categories with a likelihood based upon
the estimated probabilities of each event. If the individual does not need longterm care, no stochastic expenses are incurred. Each year, the individual again
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faces these probabilities (the probabilities of being in the different statuses
changes as the individual becomes older after reaching age 75, then again at
age 85). This continues until death or the need for long-term care. For those who
have a resulting status of home health care or nursing home care, their duration
of care is simulated based upon the distribution of the durations of care. After a
nursing home stay or episode of home health care, each individual has a probability of being discharged to one of the other three states based upon the
discharge estimates. The stochastic expenses incurred are then determined by
the length of the stay/number of days of care times the per diem charge estimated
for the nursing home care and home health care, respectively. For any person
without the need for long-term care, this process repeats annually. The process
repeats for individuals receiving home health care or nursing home care at the
end of their duration of stay/care and subsequently, if not receiving the specialized care again on their next birthdays. Those simulated to die, of course, are not
further simulated. As with the basic health care expenses, the qualiﬁcation of
Medicaid by income and asset levels is considered to see how much of the
stochastic expenses must be covered by the individual to determine his ﬁnal
expenditures for the care. Only those expenditures attributable to the
individual—not the Medicaid program—are considered as expenses to the individual and included the ‘deﬁcit’ calculations.
See VanDerhei and Copeland (2011) and VanDerhei (2012a) for an analysis of
the impact of increasing retirement ages beyond 65.
EBRI’s use of RSPM typically is conﬁned to analysis of the current retirement
system. However, it has periodically been used to evaluate potential changes to
the system, primarily from proposed legislative changes. VanDerhei (2011d),
RSPM was used to provide preliminary evidence of the impact of the ‘20/20
caps’ on projected retirement accumulations proposed by the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. Later that year, it was used to
support testimony before the Senate Finance Committee (VanDerhei 2011b) in
analyzing the potential impact of various types of tax-reform options on retirement income. This was expanded in VanDerhei (2011a). VanDerhei (2012c)
used new survey results to update the analysis of the potential impact of various
types of tax-reform options on retirement income, and VanDerhei (2013a) used
RSPM to analyze the Obama administration’s ﬁscal year (FY) 2014 budget
proposal to include a cap on tax-deferred retirement savings that would limit
the amounts accumulated in speciﬁed retirement accounts to that necessary to
provide the maximum annuity permitted for a tax-qualiﬁed deﬁned beneﬁt plan
under current law.
This assumes that the worker is physically able to keep working and that there
continues to be a suitable demand for his or her skills.
VanDerhei (2012a) provided additional evidence on whether deferring retirement to age 70 would provide retirement income adequacy for the vast majority of
Baby Boomers and Gen Xers.
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8. Many other models either ignore these costs or use deterministic adjustments to
replacement rates. However, Bajtelsmit et al. (2013) also use Monte Carlo simulation to simultaneously model stochastic ﬁnancial, health, long-term care, and
life risks.
9. For purposes of this analysis the age cohorts are deﬁned as:

• Early Boomers (born 1948–54);
• Late Boomers (born 1955–64);
• Gen Xers (born 1965–74).
10. Pre-retirement income in RSPM is determined in a manner similar to the
average-indexed-monthly-earnings computation for social security with three
modiﬁcations. All earned income is included up to the age of retirement (i.e.
there is no maximum taxable wage base constraint, and the calculation terminates at retirement age); instead of indexing for changes in average national
wages, the model indexes based on assumed, after-tax rate of return based on
asset allocations that are a function of the individual’s age in each year; and
percentile distributions are then established based on population statistics for
each ﬁve-year age cohort.
11. Only Gen Xers are shown in this portion of the analysis, given their longer future
working careers until age 65. The analysis focuses on eligibility instead of
participation to highlight the public policy issues behind plan sponsorship.
Moreover, the gradual evolution from voluntary enrollment type 401(k) plans
to automatic enrollment makes the interpretation of the impact of participation
problematic.
12. Deloitte Consulting and ICI (2011) found that the median participant-weighted
fee for 401(k) plans—including administrative, record-keeping, investment, and
other expenses—was 78 basis points.
13. The lack of a monotonically increasing range may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst.
However, many of those in the highest-income quartile have ﬁnancial resources
considerably above the threshold needed to cover 100 percent of simulated
expenses and are more immunized from the impact of a rate-of-return reduction
than those in the second- and third-income quartiles.
14. Alternative modiﬁcations would result in the same aggregate ﬁnancial situation
for the social security trust fund but would have different distributional consequences. For instance, one could add a new bend point in the Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA) formula that would result in a larger reduction for those with a
larger Average Indexed Monthly Earnings value.
15. EBRI is currently working on a separate study to model sequence of return risk
that will need to be completed before investment risk in the decumulation
period can be appropriately analyzed in RSPM.
16. Note that, even though Medicaid eligibility is factored into RSPM, an extended
stay in a nursing home is still likely to leave those alive at the end of the nursing
home stay (or the surviving spouse) in a ﬁnancially depleted condition.
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17. Future research will analyze this in more detail.
18. VanDerhei (2011c) has used RSPM to show the tremendous importance of DB
plans in achieving retirement income adequacy for Baby Boomers and Gen Xers.
Overall, the presence of a DB accrual at age 65 reduces the ‘at-risk’ percentage
by 11.6 percentage points. The DB plan advantage (as measured by the gap
between the two at-risk percentages) is particularly valuable for the lowestincome quartile, but also has a strong impact on the middle class (the reduction
in the at-risk percentage for the second and third income quartiles combined is
9.7 percentage points).
19. See Copeland (2013), Dushi et al. (2011), and Anguelow et al. (2012) for discussion of retirement plan participation levels.
20. Another way to analyze this is to compute the additional percentage of compensation that needs to be saved for a 50, 75, or 90 percent chance of ‘success.’ See
VanDerhei and Copeland (2010) for more detail.
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